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Z. ZNTRODUCTZON 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION 
As the active component of the U.S. military executes the 
most significant peace-time reduction in personnel since the 
Korean War, every aspect of the acquisition process will 
continue to be placed under the Congressional and Public 
microscope with a mandate to demonstrate its competency. 
The exact numbers are uncertain, but a reduction of at 
least 25 percent in DoD structure, during the period 1990 
through 1996, has been consistently mentioned by both the 
former Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Mr. Cheney and the 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell. 
[Ref. 22:p. 19] The active duty end strength for fiscal year 
(FY) 1991 was 91,400 fewer than in FY 1989 or approximately 
equivalent to 1980 levels. [Ref. 22:p. 22] Concomitantly, 
there is a programmed reduction in defense funding. Beginning 
in FY 1986, resources appropriated for defense have steadily 
declined. 
By fiscal year (FY) 1995, the result will be a cumulative 
10-year real decline of 22 percent, and Department of 
Defense (DOD) outlays as a percentage of our Gross 
National Product (GNP) and of total federal outlays will 
be the lowest in 50 years. . .. when the projections 
through FY 1995 are included, our actual budgets will end 
up $515 billion below what the zero-real-growth level 
would have been for the period FY 1986-95. [Ref. 22 :p. 
16] 
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B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to examine 
the current Congressional I Public acquisition environment as 
it relates to requirements determination and second, to 
provide a detailed overview of the Marine Corps acquisition 
process to conceptually assess where the process might be 
improved to effectively match up with Congressional 
expectations. The study was proposed and sponsored by, LtCol 
E.J. Lesnowicz, Head of the Lessons Learned Section, Studies 
and Analysis Branch, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting 
Center, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, 
Virginia. The study is intended to be utilized as background 
information for LtCol Lesnowicz's development of a plan which 
broadens and reinforces the application of Remedial Action 
Program information in deriving equipment based/user generated 
solutions to combat deficiencies. The Remedial Action Program 
(RAP) is intended to be, "a process through which deficiencies 
or shortfalls are identified and actions are directed to track 
resolution of the problem." [Ref. 7:p. 1 (Enclosure 2)] In 
essence, the RAP is the conduit through which combat equipment 
shortfalls, identified in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned 
System (MCLLS), are introduced into the acquisition process. 
MCLLS is the Marine Corps program for collation and 
dissemination of information submitted via exercise after 
action reports (AAR) . [Ref. 7:p. 1] 
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As the resources available to equip our military force 
decline, each weapon systems requirement, quantity, quality, 
and attendant performance thresholds, must posses the 
resilience to endure a potentially internecine competition for 
funding. To achieve the objective of the research, the 
following research question is posed: In concept, how well 
does the Marine Corps acquisition process match Congressional 
expectations regarding the necessity, efficiency and 
effectiveness of weapon systems placed into the DoD 
procurement process? 
To answer the basic research question, the following 
subsidiary questions are asked: 
1. What is the present environment as it relates to 
Congressional expectations I demands for information 
when a military service places a weapon system into the 
procurement process? 
2. In overview, what is the present Marine Corps 
Acquisition process and how does the process incorporate 
newly identified weapon systems requirements? 
3. Would the Marine Corps acquisition process better match 
Congressional expectations by formally recording "user" 
generated weapon systems performance requirements via 
the Remedial Action Program. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study includes an assessment of the need for 
expanding our current process for the initiation of weapon 
systems programs and, apriori, the generation of performance 
requirements for those systems. To this end, the study uses 
both current literary and historical examples of the potential 
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for improvement in the requirements generation process. The 
study includes a summary and analysis of the current DoD 
acquisition environment, and the U.S. Marine Corps mechanism 
for weapon systems program initiation. This study does not 
make specific recommendations as to current weapons system 
programs, but does attempt to illustrate the potential benefit 
accrued from well crafted weapon systems requirements. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research information is collected by means of a 
literature review, and several personal interviews augmented 
with subsequent telephonic interviews. There is a substantial 
amount of literature available on the broad subject of 
acquisition reform, but little devoted to the determination of 
mission need, early in the process, prior to entry into the 
formal acquisition process at milestone 0 (concept studies 
approval) . Milestone 0 is the first formal interface between 
the service's identification of a requirement for a new weapon 
system and the DoD acquisition management system which will 
ultimately procure the hardware. [Ref. 28:Part 2] Literature 
reviews consist of books, professional journals, current and 
draft regulations and directives, General Accounting Office 
reports, and the records of testimony before both the House 
and Senate Committees on the Armed Services during multiple 
Congressional sessions. This literature was accumulated from 
the Naval Postgraduate School Library, the Defense Logistics 
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Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), several DoD offices 
located at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and the U.S. 
Marine Corps Combat Development Center {MCCDC) in Quantico, 
Virginia. Both personal and telephonic interviews were 
conducted with representatives of the Marine Corps Research 
and Development Command and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Center. Personal interviews were conducted with 
representatives from each Military Headquarters and the 
representatives of the Joint Staff. The underlying premise 
for these interviews is that those responsible for day-to-day 
integration of requirements into the acquisition process are 
most familiar with each system's contents and capabilities. 
Through literature research an attempt is made to understand 
the current environment surrounding DoD acquisition and to 
determine if the product of remedial action programs can be 
incorporated into the resolution of equipment related combat 
deficiencies. Furthermore, can remedial action program 
information be synthesized with the genesis of mission need 
statements to create more durable I defensible operational 
performance requirements. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II provides background information and a recent 
historical perspective of the current and future DoD acquisi-
tion environment. Chapter II also examines the acquisition 
environment relative to its interface with Congress and 
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summarizes how those expectations will be manifested to th
e 
services when attempting to gain funding for weapon system
s. 
Chapter III examines the Marine Corps Acquisition process 
with emphasis on weapon systems program initiation. T
his 
chapter also provides a summary of how RAP information mig
ht 
be fitted into the Marine Corps acquisition process when th
e 
need exists for a historical record to match weapon system
s 
performance thresholds with the original user identifie
d 
combat deficiency. 
Chapter IV provides conclusions and recommendations for 
future research. 
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II. THE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a perspective on 
the current and future acquisition environment within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) . To capture the current posture 
and attitudes, two points of departure are utilized: first, an 
overview of public opinion, and second, a look at interaction 
between the DoD and Congressional oversight committees. In 
summary, regulatory reforms are overlaid in a brief review of 
recent changes within the DoD's approach to acquisition as the 
Department responds to Congressional demands. 
Due to the huge Federal debt service on interest accrued 
to the deficit, a flat rate of growth in Gross National 
Product, and the political reluctance to reduce domestic 
spending and transfer payments, the Department of Defense 
remains the nucleus of Congressional funding reduction 
efforts. By law, the Congress simply does not have flexibility 
in determining spending rates for interest payments or 
entitlement programs, because they are fixed amounts, as are 
their required annual increases. This fact coupled with 
sluggish revenue generation by a relatively flat GNP growth 
rate means that Congress will continually be driven to 
"National Defense" as the only available reduction opportunity 
to attack the "deficit." Although the budget certainly will 
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never be balanced on the back of "National Defense," the DoD 
will remain a viable political target. [Ref. 18:pp. 79-87] 
A. PUBLIC OPINION 
For those involved in the study of the acquisition 
business there is no surprise in discovering a widely held 
negative public opinion of the people and for the process 
related to weapons acquisition. This unflattering viewpoint 
is discussed, to some degree, in every literary reference 
viewed while conducting research for this study. [Ref. 6:pp. 
123-150 and Ref. 23:preface] 
Two representative examples are related herein; their 
implicit messages are clear. Mr. W. H. Gregory in his book, 
The Defense Procurement Mess states very flatly: 
How the American military buys its equipment is the 
subject of public derision. In the minds of much of the 
citizenry, the Pentagon procurement system is scandalous 
and the defense industry is manned by fast buck artists, 
incompetents or deranged Dr. Strangeloves who, when they 
lack weapons of mass destruction to tinker with, design 
$600 hammers or $5,000 coffeepots. The perception of the 
average taxpayer is that his military hardware money is 
being tossed around by profligate generals or admirals 
seduced by greedy, unconscionable contractors; instead of 
more bang for the buck, military procurement goes for 
either shoddy equipment of high-tech extravagances that 
don't work in the field. [Ref. 19:p. 1] 
On 15 July 1985, President Reagan established a Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management with a broad charter 
to study Defense policies and procedures. The Commission was 
to focus on adequacy and efficiency. Upon completion of their 
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study, recommendations were forwarded to the President, the 
Secretary of Defense and Congress. 
Pursuant to this process, the Commission conducted 
research to ascertain public opinions about the efficacy of 
Defense procurement. [Ref. 25:pp. 190-246] When Americans 
were asked to rank order Defense spending as a problem 
relative to other issues facing the Government, Defense budget 
inefficiency was considered a major issue second in serious-
ness only to the budget deficit. "On average Americans 
believe that almost half the U. S. defense budget is lost to 
waste and fraud." [Ref. 25:pp. 190-192] The loss was 
attributed to illegal activities (25 percent) and Defense 
mismanagement (25 percent) . When queried as to who is at 
fault for poor management in the administration of Defense 
spending, most Americans believe that Congress is "less" to 
blame than defense contractors or the Defense Department. 
"Pork barrel projects," Congressional micromanagement, and 
yearly changes in defense authorizations are not judged to be 
wasteful. [Ref. 25 :pp. 190-194] 
Dr. Jacob Stockfish begins the preface to his book, 
Plowshares Into Swords, by relating how the public has been 
made increasingly aware of problems within the Defense 
Department, in the procurement of weapon systems which 
experienced significant cost overruns or failed to meet 
performance requirements. [Ref. 17: p. IX] 
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This low public esteem for the Defense procurement arena 
continues to be fortified on a regular basis by eager media 
coverage of the latest procurement scandal (cancellation of 
the A-12, a four billion dollar program is a recent case in 
point) . The instances cited above reflect opinion from 1973 
through 1990. This dour holding by the majority of Americans 
is an apparent fact of the times and one that depicts an 
aspect of the acquisition environment which all procurement 
officials should consider as they discharge their procurement 
tasks. [Ref. 18:p. 6] 
B. MAJOR AGENCIES IN DOD PROCUREMENT 
DoD procurement involves literally tens of thousands of 
personnel employed by contractors, the military and various 
Government agencies. Congress, and the Department of Defense, 
which together determine the expenditure of the approximately 
$300 billion spent annually to equip and maintain our military 
forces. Further perspective of the acquisition environment 
will be developed through a brief discourse of the major 
participants' relative stations and their interaction. 
1. Congress 
Congress is empowered by the Constitution to raise and 
dispense funds. Accomplishment of this feat is a tedious and 
complex task performed on an annual basis. The Senate and 
House Armed Services Committees, Authorization Committees and 
Appropriation Committees, in conjunction with numerous 
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subcommittees, discharge these responsibilities. While 
Congressional oversight, in guardianship of the public trust, 
is an absolute imperative, a pervasive tendency for aggressive 
and contentious micromanagement is frequently noted. Several 
literary references viewed for this study contain at least one 
expositive comment regarding the unbalanced and inefficient 
manner in which Congress fulfills their oversight role. 
[Reference 19:pp. 49-65] 
Insight as to the weight of these requirements was 
provided in Congressional testimony by the former Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Dick Cheney, who solicited relief from the 
submission of redundant and unnecessary Congressional reports. 
He stated that, "Since 1970, the number of reports and studies 
has increased by over 2,300 percent. In FY 1989, the total 
cost of complying with Congressional reporting requirements 
was $33 million and almost 509,000 man-hours." 
35] The aggressive nature and specificity 
[Ref. 22 :p. 
applied by 
Congress, in this role, is inferred by the intense questioning 
which took place before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
during sessions reviewing the FY 1991 Defense Budget. 
On February 17, 1990, Senator Alan Dixon posed a rapid 
fire series of questions regarding weapon systems commonality 
to then Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stone. In sum, Senator 
Dixon related that the Marines had just completed a market 
survey to develop a light armored assault gun and the Army had 
recently initiated a market survey to replace the M551 
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Sheridan (light tank) . The Senator felt strongly that these 
weapon systems would be meeting identical combat needs and 
that acquiring dissimilar weapon systems to perform like 
missions was inefficient. Senator Dixon closed his question-
ing of Mr. Stone with the following remark, "Earlier this 
year, I questioned this budget because of issues that just 
didn't make any sense. And Mr. Secretary, this just does not 
make sense!" [Ref. 22:p. 364] Secretary Stone then followed 
with a lengthy defense of not only this issue but several 
other Army procurement efforts. 
On February 28, 1990, (before the same committee) 
Senator Dixon pursued the same issue, on the same weapon 
systems, with different witnesses in an attempt to find a 
fault in the logic the Army had developed to replace the M551 
Sheridan. The witness was the former Army Chief of Staff, 
General Carl Vuono. Senator Dixon's pursuit of commonality, 
with this system as an example, continued with similar 
questions as to market studies and mission needs. Further, 
Senator Dixon added that he had been assured by the Marines 
that any system they developed would also meet Army 
performance requirements. He concluded by asking General 
Vuono, 
Can you explain why any and all funding for both the Army 
and Marine Corps should not be held up in these tight 
budget times until the Army and Marine Corps can get 
together ... to meet the requirements of both services? 
[Ref. 22:p. 585] 
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The above was not an atypical exchange. Similar 
colloquy is present throughout the testimonial records of both 
the House and Senate Committees on the Armed Services. [Refs. 
22, 27, and 30] Deducible from these exchanges is not only 
the blunt tone but more importantly the necessity of unassail-
able logic and detailed knowledge in communicating a success-
ful defense of DoD weapon systems requirements. 
The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management makes a matter--of-fact recommendation which 
addresses the issue. "Congress should reduce the overlap, 
duplication and redundancy among the many Congressional 
committees and subcommittees now reviewing the defense 
budget." [Ref. 25 :p. 8] 
2. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
The DoD acquisition process has been the subject of 
much analysis since the modern day revision initiated by 
former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, in the early 
1960s. He brought to the office of the Secretary of Defense 
a "business" mentality and unsuccessfully attempted to 
institute "business" management practices into the schema of 
DoD procurement. Instead, increased layers of management and 
added paperwork created a burdensome micromanagement 
atmosphere which has persisted to the present. [Ref. 19:pp. 
1-17] The resultant slowdown in decision-making had obvious 
results: "After all this tinkering, a system that once 
designed an aircraft, missile, ship, or tank and got it into 
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production in three to five years now takes ten to fifteen 
years to do the same thing." [Ref. 19:p. 5] 
Examples of formal studies and commissions addressing 
at least one aspect of defense procurement include: The Bell 
Report- 1962, The Commission on Government Procurement- 1972, 
The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (Grace 
Commission) - 1983, The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Procurement (Packard Commission)- 1986, and the 
Defense Management Report (DMR)- 1990-91. The DMR generated 
substantial change within the DoD. When combined with the 
significant reduction in defense funding, the DMR initiatives 
developed a clear picture of focused, efficiency and 
accountability. 
The Report's major thrust is to act on problems, not 
restudy them. It stresses integrity, long-range planning, 
better communications DoD wide, strict accountability of 
managers for results, teamwork and innovation. The Report 
sets targets for management improvement, accompanied by 
substantial dollar savings. Secretary Cheney, February 1, 
1990 [Ref. 22 :p. 33] 
Some of the major areas at issue in defense procure-
ment studies have been: micromanagement by various agencies, 
acquisition personnel qualification and training, Congres-
sional authority for multi-year appropriations, a multi-source 
often conflicting regulatory/$tatutory conundrum, and most 
visibly in the media, cost overruns. 
In keeping with the premise of this study, the area of 
cost overruns is most susceptible when approached during the 
preliminary resolution of which performance characteristics 
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r------------------------------------------~~~. 
(requirements) are necessary in order to reduce the combat 
deficiency. Continuous "user generated" input could be 
employed not only to make an informed initial decision but 
keep the program manager updated with changing user perform-
ance requirements. In turn this input would assist in gauging 
the impact of cost/performance trade-offs as a weapon system 
proceeds through the DoD procurement process. A viable 
service acquisition process should include the capacity for 
this type of exchange between the program managers and the 
eventual operational "users" to assure consistent, current 
operational requirements. 
Case in point-
The C-SA Galaxy cargo aircraft was a multibillion-dollar 
program that suffered from enormous cost overruns in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. These cost problems were 
caused primarily by a combination of unrealistic and 
inflexible performance requirements. . . . The C-SA was 
required to meet a specified weight limit. It was also 
required to have the capability for austere (rough) field 
takeoff and landing .... The latter requirement forced a 
substantial redesign of the aircraft. No C-SA has yet 
used its austere landing capability .... As a result of 
the redesign, the plane exceeded the maximum weight limit. 
More redesign and the use of expensive lightweight metals 
followed. Had there been enough flexibility to relax 
either the maximum weight or the rough takeoff and landing 
requirements, the cost overrun would have been far less. 
[Ref. 1:p. 27) 
In more general terms, the military has traditionally stressed 
performance over cost. Deli very schedule, unit cost, contract 
type, and cost - performance trade-offs have played a lesser 
role, particularly during preliminary conceptualization of 
weapon systems. Historically, the overarching result has been 
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a 40% to 100% cost overrun when considering entire DoD weapon 
systems programs (from start-up through retirement). [Ref. 
18:pp. 169-178] 
The program managers charged with guiding weapon 
systems through the acquisition cycle must have the flexi-
bility and information to make trade-offs in requirements in 
order to meet the cost schedule and reduce charges of "gold-
plating" or mismanagement. To improve the effectiveness of 
those charged with monitoring weapon systems through the 
acquisition cycle (primarily the program manager), the Packard 
Commission has provided several recommendations which have 
been accepted by the DoD and incorporated into newly published 
regulations. Two of the more important changes are: (1), the 
streamlining of acquisition organizations and procedures, 
which limits the reporting chain for program managers, fixes 
responsibility for cost/ schedule/performance, and empowers 
them with more flexibility, and (2) stabilizing programs have 
been undertaken through the emphasis of cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis (COEA), the establishment of internal 
baselines for design and production costs, and consideration 
of multi-year procurement for high priority weapon systems. 
[Ref. 25:pp. 13-17 and Ref. 28:Parts 4, 5, and 11] 
C. REGULATIONS 
Thirty thousand (30,000) pages of regulations govern the 
DoD acquisition process. [Ref. 1:p. 20] Of these regulations 
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there are two primary documents which provide guidance and 
policy governing the acquisition of DoD weapon systems. They 
are DoD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, and DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies 
and Procedures. Each of these has been revised as of 23 
February 1991 and contains direction gleaned from many of the 
recurring recommendations by various studies and commissions. 
[Refs. 28 and 29] 
Each of these leading initiatives addresses enhancement of 
the acquisition process, via more economical use of DoD funds, 
yielded by the streamlined process and stricter account-
ability. There must be supporting documentation from the 
initial mission need statement (MNS) through the completion of 
a detailed acquisition plan. At each milestone there must be 
an active decision by the designated milestone decision 
authority (MDA) to proceed to the next phase of the acquisi-
tion. The intent of the guidance is to translate the identi-
fication of an equipment based combat deficiency into a 
competent weapon system solution via an integrated management 
framework that links requirements generation, acquisition 
management, and the programming, planning and budgeting 
system. [Ref. 29:Part 1 and Part 2:pp. 2-1 to 2-5] 
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D. SUMMARY 
In summary, many of the long sought changes within the DoD 
acquisition system will be pressed forward under revised, more 
practical policies necessitated given increased competition 
among the military services and reduced available funding. A 
Congress eager to pursue the domestic agenda, uncertain public 
support, and increased conflict within DoD for funding clearly 
point to the need for searching out a new paradigm to generate 
weapon systems requirements. In order to endure the "culling 
out" process, the need for particular weapon systems must 
evidence clear supportable logic upon which a solid consti-
tuency can be built. In the identification and development of 
combat deficiencies or mission needs, the information 
contained within a user generated data base could prove 
invaluable. Many of the questions posed in the preceding 
chapter could have been answered had a record been available 
which tied the specific performance requirement to the 
originally identified combat deficiency. Further, it is 
clearly indicated in the dialogue between the public, Congress 
and the Services that the most credible response to any 
challenge of a weapon systems necessity must be rooted in a 
clearly defined, well recorded "user" generated requirement. 
Given the span of years required to field a weapon system and 
its susceptibility to at tack at any point in the process; 
every respondent (to Congress or the public) must be able to 
answer the pointed question: Why does your aircraft need to 
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land on an expeditionary runway or why does your helicopter 
need to fly that fast. These questions can only be answered 
consistently and credibly if the information developed during 
the determination of mission need is available within the 
"acquisition process." There has to exist a continuously 
updated body of knowledge based on real time, user generated, 
post exercise reports covering a broad subject range from 
personnel, to doctrine, to equipment. The degree to which 
this capability exists within the Marine Corps acquisition 
system will be examined as part of the detailed process review 
in the next chapter. 
In answer to the first subsidiary question addressing the 
present acquisition environment and Congressional expecta-
tions: It can safely be deduced that weapon systems procure-
ment will generally be viewed with skepticism and each 
requirement will undergo repeated challenges to its continua-
tion at each step in the acquisition process. Whether or not 
a weapon system is ultimately fielded will be largely 
dependent upon the ability of the Services to continually, 
consistently and credibly tie the need for that weapon to an 
objectively defined combat deficiency against an ever changing 
enemy threat over a span of several years. 
19 
zzz. THE MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the U.S. Marine 
Corps requirements development process as it relates to the 
identification of operational capability for newly developed 
weaponry and/or the enhancement of existing weaponry, and, to 
explore the contrast between the intent of governing direc-
tives and the realities of their implementation. Part-n-
parcel of this review is an over-arching summary of the 
current acquisition process, how it is supposed to work, and 
the primary orders governing the process. 
The term "requirements" can have multiple meanings even 
within the vernacular of DoD acquisition. In the macro view, 
requirements could mean the nuclear and conventional weapons 
amalgam necessary to implement a national strategy. In a 
micro focus, requirements could address the appended specifi-
cations for a single equipment item which contractually bind 
the manufacturer on how to build it. [Ref. 14: pp. 26-27] 
Additionally, there is an expansive body of information which 
considers requirements issues in a broad range between the 
macro and micro definitions. For the purposes of this 
chapter, "requirements" will be discussed as the term relates 
to the required operational capabilities {ROC) of the weapon 
systems assigned to a Marine Corps combat unit. 
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Specifically, this chapter briefly examines the pre-
acquisition phase aspect of requirements determination by 
reviewing the Marine Corps process for identifying equipment 
related combat deficiencies. There are five phases in the DoD 
systems acquisition process. The first three phases: Concept 
Exploration I Definition; Concept Demonstration I Validation; 
and Full Scale Development are concerned with development of 
the weapons system and its attendant operational capabilities. 
The last two phases: Full Rate Production and Operations 
Support, are concerned with production and deployment. [Ref. 
2:pp 2.3-2.9] Locus in guo for this discussion will be the 
second subsidiary question regarding the Marine Corps acquisi-
tion process and its incorporation of newly identified weapons 
system requirements into the process. 
As the military enters an era of shrinking defense 
budgets, it is undeniable that performance requirements 
stipulated in the mission need statement must represent the 
most economical solution to the combat deficiency. 
A great deal of the final cost is dictated by those 
initial statements of need: that is, matching the purpose 
of military forces with their possible employment in 
conditions of war, peace, and crisis; examining trade-offs 
among alternate military means; and, determining what 
affordable operational capabilities are required. From 
the requirements and planning process should come defini-
tions of the basic operational capabilities and the 
attendant needs for the military systems, which can then 




Coincident with his appointment as Commandant of the 
Marine Corps in July 1987, General Gray began a major 
reorganization of the Marine Corps acquisition structure. The 
seat of professional education and doctrinal development, 
housed in various units at Quantico, Virginia, was overhauled 
from "stem to stern." The system which resulted is driven by 
two major commands; the Marine Corps Combat Development Center 
(MCCDC) , and the Marine Corps Research Development and 
Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) . The framework for their 
integrated processes, discussed herein, is contained primarily 
in two orders- the Systems Acquisition Manual [Ref. 2] and 
the Marine Corps Program Initiation and Operational Require-
ment Documents Order [Ref. 3]. Interest in the topic of how 
programs begin and more importantly how the operational 
requirements are developed has been expressed at the highest 
levels for many years. Further, it is an area that is 
apparently perpetually ripe for improvement. 
You seem to be saying, as I get it, that the men in the 
military who will actually be responsible for using the 
new weapons, the men in combat commands should be given 
more responsibility for setting the requirements for new 
weapons and testing them. Why are these functions now in 
the hands of developers rather than the men who will use 
them? [Ref. 4 :p. 123] 
These are the questions of the Honorable John Stennis, then 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, posed 
to Dr. Jacob Stockfish in response to testimony before the 
Committee. The date was 1971, and Dr. Stockfish was 
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discussing the operational requirements of a new helicopter. 
Dr. Stockfish had just responded that he had no idea why a 
proposed helicopter had to fly at a certain speed. He 
intimated that the developers had sold the requirement to the 
Army and it was not a valid tactical requirement. Two decades 
later, the concern about "real" rational system performance 
requirements continues. A GAO report published in May 1990 
provides a sense of our opportunity lost in terms of efficient 
procurement; 
In many cases, reducing performance requirements by 5 to 
10 percent could probably reduce the cost of weapons 
systems by 30 to SO percent, permitting the procurement of 
much larger numbers of only slightly less capable weapons. 
[Ref . 21 : p . 3 9] 
The war in the Persian Gulf has resulted in headlines and 
Congressional concern as to "why" close air support pilots 
attacked "friendly" forces repeatedly. Furthermore, how did 
we procure a multi-million dollar global positioning system 
that did not work effectively on the smoke covered battle-
fields of Kuwait even though reduced visibility is a well 
known and planned for aspect of the modern battlefield? [Ref. 
6] These examples underscore the conspicuous necessity for 
the development and use of the most efficient requirements 
determination process that can be generated. If we are going 
to endure a complex, politically charged acquisition process, 
which requires ten to fifteen years to complete, then the 
resulting hardware must be able to perform. To this end, the 
new DoD 5000 series instructions prescribe many common-sense 
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methodologies which must be implemented by each of the 
military services. Among these is the mandate that perform-
ance requirements be used in describing weapons systems in 
requests for proposed solutions. By opting for performance 
based operational capabilities vice concentrating on meeting 
military specifications, design specifications, contractor 
"sold" emergent technology, or other potential distractions 
the new process contains the flexibility to field a weapons 
system that works as intended on the battlefield, as it exists 
in reality, when the weapon is finally delivered. This one 
change to the process holds the potential for substantial 
economic gains in executing trade-offs among alternate 
concepts and systems. This idea (along with the "stream-
lining" nature of the DoD series) has been embraced by the 
Marine Corps and is included in the draft orders which will 
implement the DoD instructions. The balance of this chapter 
will discuss the Marine Corps acquisition process as contained 
in the draft documents and will include emphasis on require-
ments generation at the commencement of the Marine Corps 
acquisition process. 
B. STRUCTURE 
The acquisition stream depicted in both Marine Corps 
Orders PSOOO.lOc and 3900.4d, are essentially the same as that 
portrayed in Dr. Sherman's text, Government Procurement 
Management. Milestones are used at prescribed decision points 
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to gauge progress of the system from initiation to system 
review. CUriously enough, the progress from milestone 0 
{program initiation) through milestone V {system review) is 
well structured trackable and managed in detail. The "fuzzy" 
portion of the process is the same as that referred to by Dr. 
Stockfish in 1971. Is there a clear and concise answer to the 
questions? How did it get started? And, why do these 
specific operational requirements exist? The pages of Marine 
Corps Order 3900.4d provide both skeletal and specific 
direction in answer to the "how" of the program initiation 
process. In capsule form, the major drivers and concepts of 
the requirements generation and subsequent program initiation 
process will be reviewed. 
1. Concept Based Requirements System 
The Marine Corps acquisition process is set in motion 
via the methodology of a Concepts-Based Requirements System 
(CBRS). [Ref. 3:pp. 3-6] The purpose of CBRS is to provide 
capability that is driven by operational needs. The intent is 
to provide for a flexible process which is adaptable to both 
short and long range scenarios. CBRS is intended to allow the 
Marine Corps to identify combat capability needs, expose 
capability shortfalls. and bounce those findings against 
potential resolution alternatives in order to close the gaps. 
The CBRS methodology is utilized to examine combat capability 
requirements regardless of how the "gap" is initially identi-
fied. Identification of Marine Corps combat needs is intended 
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to be a "Corps-wide" pursuit. Fleet Marine Forces are the 
operational commands and generally look to near-term issues. 
MCCDC and MCRDAC are support commands and are formally 
required to examine short-mid-long range issues. The 
throughput of CBRS should be a refined concept which can be 
evaluated by testing, modelling or other means, in order to 
determine whether modification to existing equipment is 
satisfactory or if new equipment needs to be acquired. Again, 
CBRS is an idea or method in which the focus is on need driven 
resolution of a combat deficiency. 
2. Mission Areas (MA) 
The integrated missions of the Marine Corps have been 
subdivided into similar or related groupings and assigned as 
a Mission Area (MA). For example, MA #20 is ground combat and 
MA #24 is ground combat fire support. Responsibility for all 
warfighting MA's is assigned to the Commanding General (CG), 
MCCDC as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) proponent. 
The CG, MCCDC, tasks the Director (BGen) of the MAGTF 
Warfighting Center (MAGTF-WC) with the primary role in combat 
development, analysis and initiation of the acquisition 
process. Determination of mission need, the sketchy part of 
the acquisition process preceding Program Initiation 
(milestone 0), is filled in at the MAGTF- we. This early part 
of the process is much less well defined than post Milestone 
0 activities. [Ref. 2:pp. 3-21] As directed by the CG, 
MCCDC, the Director of the MAGTF- WC is the keeper of the 
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"duty experts and analysts" and is responsible for the entire 
spectrum of Marine Corps Force capabilities. The Director is 
the proponent for monitoring operational capabilities, identi-
fying deficiencies and developing concepts for employment of 
the systems produced to sustain necessary combat capabilities. 
The vehicle used to set the process in motion is the Mission 
Area Analysis (MAA) . The MAA is the primary means of 
identifying deficiencies which are then linked to plans that 
will reduce the deficiencies. [Ref. 3: p. 6) The outcome of 
a MAA should provide clear direction concerning the opera-
tional needs, shortfalls, candidate solutions, and priorities. 
[Ref. 2:pp. 3-21) The MAA recommendations will be incorpor-
ated into one of four areas: doctrinal development, force 
structure realignment, training adjustments, or research and 
development. Once a material deficiency has been identified 
and validated by a MAA, the CG, MCCDC, establishes the 
priorities of applicable operational requirements and presents 
them for consideration during the Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) preparation at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) . 
3. Strategic Plans 
The Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP) outlines the 
Commandant's guidance and prescribes the Marine Corps 
contribution to the national defense. It contains an 
appraisal of the probable missions the Corps may perform, 
including expectations and limitations. Specific direction is 
promulgated to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Commanders 
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(Lieutenant General) concerning objectives to be attained 
within a set time frame. Similar direction is provided to the 
major supporting agencies. The overreaching intent is to make 
certain that the Commandant's vision of the current and future 
capabilities of the Marine Corps is reflected. This plan is 
the springboard from which the MA specialists take their 
perspective for gauging what the Marine Corps' combat 
capabilities need to be. [Ref. 3:p. 5 and Ref. 2:pp. 3-25] 
"The MAGTF Master Plan (MMP) establishes the opera-
tional foundation for the organization, manning, equipping, 
training, and development of doctrine and operational tech-
niques for MAGTF's." [Ref. 3:p. 6] The focus is mid-range, 
from one to ten years out. Direction is provided regarding 
resource allocation for the same four areas as referred to in 
the CBRS: organization, training, equipment and doctrine. The 
most critical purpose of the MMP is to announce guidance for 
the drafting of several detailed supporting annexes: the 
MAGTF command annex, the MAGTF Ground Combat Annex, the MAGTF 
Aviation Combat Annex, and the MAGTF Combat Service Support 
Annex. These annexes catalog the detailed actions which need 
to be taken in the four areas (organization, training, 
equipping, and doctrinal development) to ensure that Marine 
Corps combat capability will meet or exceed potential threat 
capability. The MMP allows for the consideration and 
programming of developmental initiatives as needs are 
uncovered. These initiatives are then prioritized and compete 
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for funding in the POM process. The MMP is published every 
other year based upon guidance from the Commandant. The 
Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP) aggregates concepts and 
goals considered fundamental to accomplishing combat missions 
in the future. It also is developed by the CG, MCCDC staff at 
the MAGTF-WC and, as the name implies takes the perspective of 




in the future. The MLRP presents 
technologies juxtaposed with potential 
As with any large organization, essential permanent 
communication is accomplished in writing. Currently, each of 
the orders which implement the entire acquisition process are 
under review to ensure compliance with the DoD 5000 series. 
Three of the more descriptive documents which will remain in 
the system (albeit possibly renamed) are: the mission need 
statement (MNS)/initial statement of requirement (ISOR), the 
development options paper (DOP) -{now the operational require-
ments document}, and the required operational capability 
(ROC). [Ref. 3 :pp. 5-9] Once a Mission Area Analysis has 
identified that the deficiency must be filled through the 
material acquisition process, this need is documented in a 
mission need statement (MNS) or initial statement of 
requirement (ISOR). These serve as the basis for initiating 
a program. The specific hardware solutions are not included 
herein, but are developed in the concept exploration phase 
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prior to milestone I. A MNS is necessary for all new starts 
where outlays exceed $300 million for research and development 
or $1.8 billion for the total procurement of all Acquisition 
Category {ACAT) I systems. An ISOR is required for all 
programs considered less than major: ACAT II, III, and IV 
systems. 
After completion of the MNS/ISOR, responsibility for 
preparation of the development options paper {DOP) shifts to 
the Commanding General, MCRDAC. The DOP will for the first 
time outline all feasible alternatives which provide the 
performance range necessary to reduce the deficiency. Cost is 
not yet an overt consideration. The CG, MCRDAC via his 
Directors of Tests & Evaluation and Amphibious Warfare 
Technology, will conduct concept evaluations as necessary. 
The DOP will help guide in choosing among those alternatives 
available which can best be developed into a viable ROC. The 
required operational capability (ROC) is the driving document 
used in the acquisition process from milestone 0 forward. It 
should describe the required capability not just a single 
system. One or more potential solutions may be discussed. It 
includes a statement of the need, a threat description, 
operational and organizational concepts, and the essential 
performance characteristics. 
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C. PROCESS AND STAFF INTEGRATION 
As can be drawn from the preceding dialogue, the 
requirements generation and program initiation process, i
s 
intended to be a highly structured, integrated, need drive
n 
system which objectively seeks out not only combat deficien-
cies but initiates the process to overcome them. 
The balance of this chapter discusses the specific 
assignment of responsibilities to and the interaction amo
ng 




The Marine Corps acquisition team consists of several 
staffs housed at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C
. 
{HQMC); MCCDC/ MCRDAC, Quantico, Virginia; and the Fleet 
Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. The members of this tea
m 
have been condensed, for this discussion, to include: th
e 
Commandant of the Marine Corps ( CMC) ; the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Requirements and Programs (DC/S R&P) ; the Commanding 
General, Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisitio
n 
Command ( CG MCRDAC) ; the Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command (CG MCCDC); and the Commanding 
Generals, Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific (CG FMF 
PAC/LANT). [Ref. 3 :pp. 3-7] 
a. As stated earlier, CMC breathes life into the 
acquisition system via the Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP) , 
specifically: 
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the MCCP frames the Commandant's intent and forms the 
basis for the architecture of the future warfighting 
capabilities of the Marine Corps. It guides what has to 
be accomplished and tells why it needs to be done. The 
MCCP also serves to provide direction to appropriate 
supporting establishments to ensure that action is taken 
on all relevant issues which reflect the Commandant's 
intent and the vision of the future Marine Corps. The 
plan provides the platform to capture innovative concepts, 
and to institutionalize Marine Corps planning processes, 
CMC policies, and needed program initiatives. [Ref. 4:p. 
5) 
Additionally, CMC has the obvious overall responsibility for 
the capability of the Marine Corps to perform its assigned 
specified missions and any other tasks which the President may 
direct. 
b. DC/S R&P has the responsibility to ensure that 
funding is correctly reflected in the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) and serves as an "honest broker" in the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting Process (PPBS) to assist 
CMC in the prioritization and funding of programs. DC/S R&P 
is specifically tasked to: 
review, monitor and validate Marine Corps capability 
requirements as they progress from general statements of 
required operational capability (ROC) in planning 
documents through successively refined statements in 
acquisition and programming documents to ascertain program 
consistency, completeness and harmony. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-8] 
As part of the literal translation of these responsibilities, 
DC/S R&P articulates unresolved programming issues, provides 
official comments on documents and ensures the HQMC staff 
analyzes requirements validation and program development. 
[Ref. 3 :pp. 3-9] 
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c. The CG MCRDAC has broad oversight responsibility 
for the complete acquisition process from development of 
systems/equipment to their production and modification. He is 
the designated Marine Corps Program Executive Officer (PEO), 
and is the approval authority for Master Acquisition Plans 
(MAPS) . [Ref. 3:pp. 3-13] Three of his primary supporting 
agents are: his Deputy for Programs/Deputy Commanding General, 
the Director of Amphibious Warfare Technology, and all Program 
Managers. The Deputy for Programs is tasked with overall 
organizational management for all aspects of MCRDAC's 
operation. Some of his specific responsibilities are to 
coordinate programmatic actions with the CG MCCDC, and to 
maintain close liaison with their Warfighting Center. [Ref. 
3 :pp. 3-18] 
The Director of Amphibious Warfare Technology is 
the primary advisor to the CG MCRDAC on all matters related to 
research and technology. He is specifically tasked to 
identify emerging technology and to assess new technological 
development in terms of its potential application for 
increasing combat capability. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-20] Program 
Managers are the action arm of the acquisition business as 
designated by the CG MCRDAC. They work directly for the CG 
under his PEO hat and have full authority for management of 
their specified acquisition projects. 
PMs develop plans I program and budget for funds 1 and 
manage assigned programs as assigned by the PEO and other 
appropriate higher authority. PMs are assigned during the 
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requirements determination process. PMs are assisted in 
the acquisition process by a matrix management organiza-
tion which provides functional support under the direction 
of the Deputy for Support, MCRDAC. They manage assigned 
programs from inception through milestone IV (Logistics 
Review) with respect to cost, schedule, performance and 
supportability. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-16] 
d. The CGs of FMF PAC/LANT are charged to work in 
concert with GCMCCDC to identify, review, and validate 
operational requirements and to support operational testing of 
new equipment and systems. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-23] The minimal 
involvement of user units in the initiation and development of 
new equipment may well be an area where the process can be 
demonstrably improved. This potential is discussed in the 
next section entitled "How the Process Works." 
e. The CG MCCDC is the primary agent for the Marine 
Corps in the development of Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) required operational capabilities (ROC) . The critical 
role, within MCCDC, is played by members of the MAGTF 
Warfighting Center. The Marines assigned here work through a 
process termed the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) to 
identify combat capability deficiencies and initiate the 
acquisition process. The role of the MAGTF Warfighting Center 
illuminates the majority of the issues in question. Most of 
the process involving program initiation and the development 
of initial required operational capabilities is begun in the 
MAGTF Warfighting Center. [Ref. 3 :pp. 3-21] "Proponency" for 
the Marine Corps combat capability and the development of 
required operational capabilities rests here. Requirements 
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for changes to doctrine, force structure and equipment are 
identified by the Mission Area Analysis section {MAA) and a 
solution to the combat deficiency is set in motion. The 
Center is tasked with the development of the Marine Corps Long 
Range Plan {MLRP) and the Marine Corps MAGTF Master Plan which 
prioritizes mid-range objectives. By serving as the proponent 
for Fleet Marine Force POM initiatives in the PPBS process, 
the Center influences and prioritizes short range objectives. 
As can be seen from these excerpts of their responsibilities, 
the Center has {according to structure) a pervasive role in 
the initiation of equipment development and acquisition. 
2. Function 
The intended functioning of the start up process is 
delineated in sections of MCO 3900.4D and is outlined in this 
paragraph. [Ref. 4:pp. 3-15) A new program initiation is the 
result of an outflow from the concepts based requirements 
system (CBRS) . It is here that the second subsidiary 
question, relating to the identification of weapon systems 
requirements can be addressed in more depth. This methodology 
starts with the Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP) as a 
framework. Combat capability is then analyzed against current 
and future Marine Corps missions and doctrine. The vehicle 
used to identify deficiencies is the Mission Area Analysis 
(MAA) . These are conducted within the MAGTF Warfighting 
Center at MCCDC. The Mission Areas MAs are broken into 
related broad areas such as "ground combat" and "combat 
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service support." The MAA will bounce operational concept 
against probable threat scenario. Gaming, simulation and 
field exercises will be used to refine deficiencies and these 
results will serve as the foundation for future operational 
parameters. Once an MAA identifies a significant deficiency, 
a decision will be made to address the shortfall by means of 
personnel, doctrine, equipment modifications, or new equipment 
acquisitions. If the decision is made to close the capability 
gap with new equipment, the requirement will be articulated in 
one of several document formats. The Mission Need Statement 
(MNS), the Initial Statement of Requirement (ISOR), the 
Preliminary Training Device Requirement (PTDR) , and the 
Requirements Submission (RS) are each utilized as required to 
communicate the validated need. The CG MCRDAC will review the 
draft program initiation document and produce an affordable 
cost estimate (ACE) . The ACE will be attached to the program 
initiation document for further staffing. Ultimately, the 
approval of this initiating document at the appropriate 
Acquisition Category Level (ACAT) will constitute program 
initiation. The acquisition program will then be included to 
compete for funding in the MCCDC evaluation process and then 
in POM action at Headquarters Marine Corps. The program will 
be assigned a priority and then placed in either the MAGTF 
Master Plan (MMP) or the Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP) . 
The priority ranking is a critically important issue from a 
practical point of view. The MMP includes projects from one 
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to ten years out and the MLRP contains future projects up to 
twenty years down-range. The loiter time of these projects 
from one to twenty years and the ability of the program to be 
managed in an effective manner by successive officers may be 
one of the primary areas which needs to be improved. After 
the publication of the MNS, ISOR, PTDR, or RS, the CG MCCDC 
will request that CG MCRDAC prepare a Development Options 
Paper (DOP). This document is required for all ACAT I, II, 
III, and IV programs unless waived by the Assistant Commandant 
of the Marine Corps (ACMC). Its purpose is to lay out all 
potential acquisition alternatives from the low grade 
modification of existing equipment to the development of 
advanced technological systems. CG MCRDAC may elect to 
conduct further concept testing in order to evaluate different 
proposals against "capability, feasibility, and afford-
ability." The period allowed for the development of the DOP 
will not exceed four months. A Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
(LCCE) will be completed in accordance with an approved MCRDAC 
costing method, which is standardized to allow for cross 
comparison against other programs. The DOP with the LCCE 
attached will be used to frame essential information used to 
construct the Required Operational Capability (ROC) statement. 
The ROC is the root document to support the Acquisition 
process. It will describe the specific equipment/material 
capabilities necessary to fill the prescribed deficiency 
identified by the initiating document. When the ROC is 
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approved it will be used as a foundation for added exploration 
or development of more alternatives. In other words the ROC 
will be used as the basis for the decision on whether to enter 
the concept demonstration phase of development. The ROC will 
not provide a narrow description of equipment but rather the 
whole range of capabilities required to close the deficiency 
gap. It may even identify more than one feasible approach to 
fill the gap. 
The ROC includes a statement of need, a description of the 
threat, the operational deficiency to be overcome, the 
operational and organizational concepts, the essential 
performance and suitability characteristics together with 
any preplanned product improvements (P3I), the life cycle 
cost estimate and any other important considerations. 
[Ref. 3 :pp. 8-9) 
The ROC may be amended during the development process but the 
basic deficiency need will not be altered unless the threat 
changes. It is interesting to note that the only formal 
access to the initiation process by the users in the Fleet 
Marine Forces is via the FMF/Supporting Establishment Opera-
tional Need Statement (FONS) . It is specifically noted that 
it is not a requirements document but a channel for the user 
to state an operational need or deficiency. The CG MCCDC 
reviews the FONS and if the requirement is validated, 
appropriate documents are prepared and the need will be folded 
into the CG MCCDC process. 
Almost all initiating documents are staffed in rough 
draft form by CG MCCDC to a broad audience. After appropriate 
comment and discussion among the various staffs, a smooth 
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document is prepared and forwarded to ACMC for approval. If 
approved, the MNS is forwarded to Secretary of the Navy 
(SecNav) for the Naval Acquisition Executive (NAE) and then 
the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) for approval prior to 
publication by the CG MCCDC. This completes the review of the 
functional process of acquisition initiation. 
3. •Hown The Process Works 
The part of the process which includes program 
initiation would indicate that analysts housed at the MAGTF 
Warfighting Center, working in concert with DC/S R&P, would be 
continuously scrubbing our present combat capability and 
comparing it with assigned Marine Corps missions. Once a 
significant deficiency was detected the system would suggest 
steps to close the capability gap. When the answer identified 
required a new item of equipment then the acquisition system 
would be put in harness and ultimately the item would be added 
to the inventory. The directives also portray a thorough 
staffing of requirements development documents among MCDRAC, 
MCCDC and the Fleet Marine Forces in which each agency makes 
comments and recommendations to ensure that the completed ROC 
has undergone a rigorous brainstorming process and describes 
the "best" answer to the deficiency in performance terms. To 
be sure, a quick read of the process would not highlight a 
systemic problem regarding the issues in question. There are 
however, some underlying obstacles. According to the source 
indicated by LtCol Lesnowicz [Ref. 15]: 
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a. The Mission Area Analysts are inundated with n
ear 
term projects geared to answering Table of Organization (T/0) 
and Table of Equipment (T/E) problems. There is no ongoing
 
comprehensive audit to cross compare mission and 
capability. 
The equipment issues which are worked consist of 
those which 
were previously identified or those which become 
"a gleam in 
the proponent's eye. 11 This critical part of 
the process 
breaks down under the weight of day to day activity
. Acquisi-
tion initiation is more driven by: obvious techno
logy break-
through, separate service "piggy-back," or sen
ior officer 
interest. In spite of the nebulous process, the M
arine Corps 
remains ably equipped. The supposition is that ser
vice-shared 
projects and the genuine wisdom of our senior officers absorb 
the slack from lack of adherence to the stated proc
ess when it 
comes to identification of new equipment. 
b. There is system access for the "users" in 
the 
Fleet Marine Forces via the FONS, and by comment
 throughout 
the staffing of proposed (ROC) statements. Additionally, 
there are informal opportunities for input fro
m both the 
operational side and the developmental side. It
 would seem 
that sufficient access exists to allow for adequa
te exchanges 
of information to take place to accomplish a "best"
 capability 
description/modification. Here the issue become
s a case of 
intercommand communication gaps. The problem fo
r the Fleet 
Marine Force is one of "out of sight, out of mind
." They are 
completely engrossed in the functioning of an
 expansive 
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command, and no one is assigned. tasked. or responsible for 
fulfilling the input requirements. Human nature runs its 
course and low priority is assigned to these types of queries 
from the "acquisition system" side. This same situation also 
becomes the bottle-neck for input attempts by the "user." 
From a different angle, it becomes too tedious to get the 
General to sign off on the input when there is no staff member 
tasked with the responsibility. Thus the input is permanently 
tabled, or so filtered it does not resemble the original 
proposal. 
From this perspective, the functional design of 
the acquisition process may not match up to the "how" it 
really works aspect of the process. For the purposes of this 
review; any such disconnect can only serve to undermine the 
integrity of the process and will inevitably lead to the 
erosion of credibility in light of the demanding Congressional 
I public environment described in Chapter II. To take 
advantage of the heightened credibility afforded "user-based" 
operational requirements; the FONS and MCLLS generated 
remedial action input should be energized. And once recorded, 
"user-based" input must be continually updated and provided to 
the program manager at each step in the acquisition process. 
D. SUMMARY 
The answer to the second subsidiary question; regarding 
incorporation of newly identified weapon systems requirements 
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is neatly identified from a regulatory perspective by the
 
preceding review of the Marine Corps acquisition proces
s 
structure. What emerges is an elaborate and complex proces
s 
that seeks integration across command lines and allows fo
r 
continuous improvement of the weapon systems require
d 
operational capabilities while maintaining linkage to th
e 
operating forces. Thus ensuring that the resulting weap
on 
system can perform adequately to reduce the targeted gap in 
combat capability when it is delivered to the field. However
, 
this offers an incomplete answer without comparison as to ho
w 
the process works in day-to-day operation. The "how" as to 
process, reveals some potential practical limitations a
nd 
points out the existence of gaps between the process a
s 
written and the process as performed. On the one hand, w
e 
have a large superstructure designed to coincide with th
e 
recommendations and direction provided by the DoD. On th
e 
other hand, there is minimal structure "below the waterline,"
 
to integrate the pivotal role played by a handful of Missio
n 
Area Analysts and no systemic solution to ensure tha
t 
information relating to the original development of th
e 
required operational capability is continuously updated an
d 
available to the program manager. 
On balance, the Marine Corps acquisition process as 
executed by well intended officers has somehow managed to
 
equip Marine units with the capacity to perform their assigne
d 
combat missions. Over a period of several years, the Marin
e 
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Corps has developed and fielded weapon systems which have 
allowed for maintaining capability over a wide range of combat 
roles and missions. However, historical accomplishment alone 
will not assure future success in weapon systems procurement. 
Given the unprecedented DoD "drawdown," a demanding Congress 
I public, and ever increasing technical complexity of the 
weapon systems being procured, the challenges to the integrity 
of the Marine Corps acquisition process will be significant. 
An important gauge as to the efficiency, of the current 
process, and the durability of the weapon systems operational 
performance requirements generated by that process will be: 
how well the process as written matches up to the process as 
practiced. 
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IV. SUMMARY I RECOMMENDATIONS I CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In answer to the third subsidiary question, as to the 
potential for better matching Congressional I public expecta-
tions by formally recording "user-based" weapon system 
performance requirements via the Remedial Action Program; the 
answer is clearly affirmative. Chapter II demonstrated the 
need for a resilient required operational capability that will 
withstand the test of time in a demanding oversight environ-
ment. Through the use of examples from literature and 
Congressional testimony it was shown that the most durable 
required operational capabilities are those which have been 
"user-based'' and reflect a combat deficiency which can be 
recounted over a span of time. Chapter III reviewed a complex 
Marine Corps acquisition process and noted that while the 
process was vigorous "on paper" there were some important 
disconnects "in practice" which could lead to a loss of 
information over time and/or a distancing of the acquisition 
process from the user. It is clear from this research that 
the more effective the integration of the acquisition process 
with the operational, "user" input, process, the better we 
will be able to match Congressional I public expectations in 
a demanding environment. Taken in overview, there are several 
44 
notions/ problems discussed previously which lend themselves 
to obvious recommendations. There are also certain thoughts 
gained from reviewing the research material which are resident 
in the issues discussed if not specifically detailed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Responsibility 
One of the underlying difficulties in the Marine Corps 
acquisition system is highlighted by both Dr. Stockfish [Ref. 
17:p. 131] and Dr. Massey, [Ref. 14:p. 20] relating to DoD as 
a whole. That is the problem of responsibility. During the 
process of initiation there is minimal fixing of responsi-
bility in the Marine Corps system. As the process gets under 
steam, a Program Manager is assigned, but this is too late. 
At that point, basic decisions and more importantly basic 
assumptions have already been made. These are not recorded 
and may have been made by one officer acting alone. The 
experts seem to suggest that the paper trail is filled with a 
large quantity of information rather than the necessary 
quality of information throughout an acquisition program. It 
also appears that the inability to reconstruct the baseline 
assumptions present during the initial transition from 
operational deficiency to perfor.mance parameters is critical 
to preventing future decisions from being delayed or 
misguided, because the program managers cannot accurately 
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replicate the perspective of the •users• who originall
y 
identified the need for the weapon system. 
For example: absent the basic assumptions which led 
to a decision on a certain tank main gun cannon size, 
a 
downrange decision could easily bungle the rationale into
 
mistaking the need for a new gun into the need for a new tan
k 
that does not necessarily close the combat capability gap
. 
Assume that an operational deficiency exists in that our tan
k 
round cannot penetrate the threat tank unless it can pas
s 
through lOOmm of armor plate. During our initial development
, 
we determined that given the current state of the art fo
r 
armor and ammunition, we must have a 120mm main gun
. 
Following this, we discover that a new tank will be required
 
to handle the larger gun. The acquisition system is set in
 
motion to obtain the new tank with the new gun. At a late
r 
date, but prior to full scale production, any one of severa
l 
events could occur which could lead down the wrong road. 
A 
development in ammunition technology could obviate the nee
d 
for a 120mm cannon and accordingly the new system. 
A 
development in armor protection makes it impossible for an
y 
round smaller than a lSOmm cannon to obtain the desire
d 
destructive capability, again removing the need for the new
 
tank. A changing global situation results in a missio
n 
realignment which removes the threat theater that required th
e 
new gun. Of equal significance, competition for funding coul
d 
force system capability trade-offs, wherein the critica
l 
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performance capability is lost in the "noise level" of getting 
a new tank. Any one of dozens of downrange events could 
mandate a review of the acquisition. If the baseline 
assumptions are not available the entire process must be 
completed from square one. The resources wasted in 
reinventing the decision process must inevitably result in a 
drawing out of the acquisition in terms of both time and 
money. More critically, a significant misstep could place 
Marines in combat without the combat capability the mission 
demands. Remember, in the brief example, there was never a 
need for a new tank. The combat capability required was to 
penetrate armor not buy a tank. 
The recommendation of this thesis is that the Program 
Manager be assigned prior to development of the ROC, and that 
the assumptions which condition initial decisions about 
performance parameters be reduced to writing and made a 
permanent part of the systems history. Under the old 
acquisition system, pre-1987, much of this work was done by 
the Acquisition Coordination Council (ACC). [Ref. 28] Under 
this structure, interaction between MCRDAC and MCCDC was 
detailed and frequent. A similar arrangement, expanded to 
include the FMF, should be initiated. This would fix 
responsibility at the program manager billet and allow for an 
available record to be reviewed as needed. 
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2. Communication 
The question here is how do we give the issue of input 
to ROC decisions enough visibility to provide for continuous 
and credible cross-talk among MCDRAC, MCCDC and the FMF. In 
an environment where each of the players in the process are 
not structurally forced to integrate, the exchange will not 
take place on a routine basis. There are too many competing 
issues. Yet, a need for this discussion is stipulated in 
virtually all of the research material. Additionally, the 
current state of the Marine Corps acquisition system does not 
completely fill the void. The system allows for "user" input 
but it is an extracurricular event. The recommendation of 
this thesis is to attach the responsibility for input to a 
principle staff officer in the FMF headquarters. For example, 
the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, Plans officer, could be 
tasked with this responsibility in conjunction with his 
traditional role of developing strategic plans. [Ref. 6] 
Also, each of the Commanding Generals would have to introduce 
sufficient interest in the process to create an environment 
where a meaningful dialogue is the routine not a frustrating 
exception. It should be noted that this type of discussion is 
not foreign to the officers in the "user" forces. The 
analysis of capability takes place with every deployment and 
every exercise. Further this information is already required 
in large measure by the submission of lessons learned via the 
MCLLS. The only added work that is involved is attaching the 
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information to the appropriate program and interacting with 
the MCDRAC - MCCDC staffs. Here too, the vehicle already 
exists in the form of the Remedial Action Program. Via RAP 
the acquisition system, housed in Quantico, can readily 
interact with cognizant FMF staff officers, located around the 
world, to continually update required operational performance 
capabilities and assess the impact of cost benefit trade-off 
decisions by the program managers, before they are made. 
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The lack of "user" input and/or the incomplete development 
of required operational capability has been a longstanding 
issue within DOD. Personal observation, recognized experts in 
the field and authors have all defined the problem over the 
last forty-plus years. In his book, The Defense Game, Mr. 
Richard Stubbing, relates yet another story of the system 
(Army) shooting itself in the foot over the capability 
required of a critical item of equipment, a remotely piloted 
vehicle. This was a "tail wagging the dog" scenario where 
unnecessary requirements drove the program vice the actual 
combat deficiency. [Ref. 13 :pp. 146-149] 
The existence of the problem is not a contentious issue. 
The wholesale redirection of attitudes and thought processes 
within the acquisition system, however, is a complex and 
richly quarrelsome issue. The overreaching solution is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the Marine Corps "system 
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fix" is largely in place and has been published at least in a 
draft version. [Ref. 3] With a small change to staff 
responsibility at the FMF Headquarters and interest at the 
general officer level many of the questions at issue would be 
quickly resolved. 
Three areas in which further study could provide benefit 
are: 
1. A detailed examination of the Marine Corps Lessons 
Learned System and its integration with the Remedial 
Action Program. 
2. An examination of selected weapon systems procurement 
histories to objectively identify where the process 
record does not match up to process expectation. 
3. An analysis as to how the Total Quality Leadership 
concept is utilized to continuously improve the Marine 
Corps acquisition process. 
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